CARA on Catholic Conservative Republicans

 The Cooperative Election Study (CES) is the largest academic survey focused on American elections. Since 2006, the study has interviewed more than a half-million Americans to capture their views on contemporary policy debates, their engagement in political and social life, and their vote choices in federal and state elections. The study is a collaborative enterprise partially funded by the National Science Foundation and involving the participation of hundreds of scholars and students across dozens of academic institutions across the country. 

CARA analyzed the data from the CES. 

In 2026, we are finally at a point where we can confidently report survey findings about the youngest (and oldest) American Catholic adult generations. To do so we use the Pew Research Center’s generational year definitions. The youngest, Gen-Z were born between 1997 and 2012, however we can only “see” those born 1997 to 2006 in current adult survey data (i.e., ages 18 and older). It’s with these youngest Catholics that there seems to be the greatest interest in data. 

How Democratic or Republicans are Catholics by Generation? 

How Conservative or Liberal are Catholics by Generation?

ADULT CATHOLICS	ALL	SILENT	BOOMERS	GEN-X	MILLENIALS	GEN-Z
REPUBLICAN	24	21	25	26	24	19
NEITHER	43	52	44	42	41	45
DEMOCRAT	33	27	32	31	36	36
CONSERVATIVE OR VERY	29	52	36	31	21	16
SOMEWHAT CONSERVATIVE	12	9	14	12	11	10
MIDDLE OF ROAD/UNSURE	34	20	30	35	36	45
SOMEWHAT LIBERAL	10	8	8	8	12	11
LIBERAL OR VERY LIBERAL	15	11	12	13	20	19

CARA answers

Overall, in 2024, adult Catholics were 33% Democrat, 24% Republican, and 43% independent, affiliated with some other political party, or were unsure of their party affiliation. Gen-Z Catholics were a bit more Democratic (36%) and a bit less Republican (19%). The most Republican segment of Catholics were Baby Boomers (25%) and Gen-X (26%). All generations were more likely to be Democrats than Republicans and all have a plurality who do not affiliate with either major party.

Party affiliation is only half of the story. Overall, Catholics tend to be more conservative than liberal when describing their political ideology. I have often described the median Catholic voter is a center-right Democrat and we can see the Catholic vote shift from Democrats to Republicans and back over time. Forty-one percent either describe themselves as very conservative, conservative, or somewhat conservative compared to the 25% who say they are very liberal, liberal, or somewhat liberal. Broken down by generation, there is a distinct pattern where we can see older Catholics being more conservative and younger Catholics less so. However, rather than liberals supplanting conservatives among younger Catholics it is more likely that they identify as middle of the road or not sure of their political ideology.

CARA on AI

Nineteen Sixty-four is a research blog for the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA) at Georgetown University edited by Mark M. Gray. CARA is a non-profit research center that conducts social scientific studies about the Catholic Church. Founded in 1964, CARA has three major dimensions to its mission: to increase the Catholic Church's self understanding; to serve the applied research needs of Church decision-makers; and to advance scholarly research on religion, particularly Catholicism. 

I wondered if they had anything to say about media reports that the number of people participating in OCIA had greatly increased.

Are people flocking to Catholicism in the US?

Conclusion

So, are people flocking to Catholicism in the United States?

The available data do not yet allow us to answer that question definitively. What they do show is a more nuanced and interesting picture than either optimism or skepticism alone would suggest.

After years of steady decline prior to the pandemic, total entries into the Church returned to their expected trajectory by 2022 and then exceeded that trajectory in 2023 and 2024. Whether this reflects delayed participation during COVID or the beginning of a new pattern remains uncertain.

At the diocesan level, the story is uneven. Some dioceses appear to be experiencing something genuinely distinctive, while others look much as they have for years. Differences in population size, demographics, and institutional structure all shape what entry patterns look like on the ground.

When the 2025 data are finally released, they will matter not because they confirm a headline, but because they will tell us whether recent increases represent a short-term rebound or a more durable shift in how people are entering the Catholic Church in the United States.

For now, the prudent conclusion is simple: something may be happening, but the data are still catching up

Much more interesting was the following post on June 12 2025

Does AI know who the Pope is?

MAGA split is a struggle for the church's soul?

 Many believed that the last three elections were an existential struggle for America’s soul, reflecting a struggle for the soul of Christianity in this country—not just evangelical Christianity but of the Catholic Church too. Unfortunately MAGA won and the gospels lost. 

  Rebecca Bratten Weiss discusses this in her latest column in NCR.  She has an interesting background. She graduated from Steubenville but eventually rejected much of the right- wing Catholicism of that college. She suggests that Trump’s assault on Pope Leo is creating a split between white MAGA Catholics and white evangelicals.  Agree?  

Does Just War Doctrine Require Moral Certainty?

According to Edward Feser in an essay in First Things, the answer to the question "Does just war doctrine require moral certainty?" is yes. 

Feser's essay concludes with this paragraph:

Thus does the tradition require moral certainty if a war is going to be just. Those who admit that the case for the Iran war is problematic are wrong to conclude that Catholics can legitimately disagree over the matter, or that we should suspend judgment. If the war does not meet the standard of moral certainty, then we can be certain that we must oppose it.

Here is an excerpt from earlier in the essay:

Exactly what degree of certainty is required, and why does the tradition require it? Both questions are best answered by way of stock examples. Suppose a hunter considers firing into some bushes. On standard natural law thinking, he may do so only if he is certain there is no other hunter behind them. If he considers it merely probable that there is no one behind them and fires anyway, he is guilty of wrongdoing, even if he doesn’t hit anyone. For his action was reckless. Or consider a jury deciding whether to sentence an accused murderer to be executed. They may not do so if they think it merely probable that he is guilty (as opposed to being certain “beyond a reasonable doubt” that he is guilty). For to leave open the serious possibility of executing an innocent man would be a grave injustice, just as the murder itself is.

This is the degree of certainty that the tradition says governing authorities must have about the justice of a war before initiating it. The reason should be obvious. If it is gravely immoral to risk killing a fellow hunter or a person wrongly accused of a crime, then it is even more gravely immoral to enter into a war that is, at best, only arguably just.

To forestall misunderstandings, note that the claim is not that governing authorities must have absolute or metaphysical certainty (of the kind we have when we know, for example, that 1 + 1 = 2). Nor does the tradition claim that we need to have certainty about every aspect of a war. We need to be morally certain only that a proposed war meets all just war criteria (just cause, lawful authority, right intention, right means, and so on). For example, one of the criteria of a just war is that “there must be serious prospects of success” (as the Catechism puts it). Hence, governing authorities don’t need to be certain of the success. However, they do need to be certain that there are serious prospects of success.

 

Bishop Barron on Just War

This is a paragraph from a post by Bishop Barron on X:

The role of the Church, therefore, is to call for peace and to urge that any conflict be strictly circumscribed by the moral constraints of the just war criteria. But it is not the role of the Church to evaluate whether a particular war is just or unjust. That appraisal belongs to the civil authorities, who, one presumes, have requisite knowledge of conditions on the ground. So, is the war in question truly the last resort? Is there really a balance between the good to be attained and the destruction caused by the war? Are combatants and non-combatants being properly distinguished in the waging of the conflict? Do the belligerents have right intention? Is there a reasonable hope of success? The posing of those questions—indeed the insistence upon their moral relevance—belongs rightly to the Church, but the answering of them belongs to the civil authorities.

Aren't the passages I have boldfaced just another way of saying the pope should stay out of politics?  Even if the American and Israeli administrations have a plausible case to make that the war against Iran is a just war, is Bishop Barron saying there may never be a war that it is so obviously not just that the pope can't say so? Who among the civil authorities responsible for waging war are going declare that the war they are responsible for is unjust?

"What would you give up to make American healthcare better?"

 There was a thought provoking article on Bulwark this morning by Ezekiel Emanuel: What Would You Give Up to Make American Health Care Better?

It is thought provoking in the sense of things to think about, but not really tackling the big problems. A few things I would be on board with, and a lot of things I wouldn't be.  

From the article:

Great NCR Article on the Imprecatory Psalms

Saint Augustine is Key to the Difference between Pete Hegseth and Pope Leo  

In the aftermath of U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's recent Pentagon prayer and Pope Leo XIV's Palm Sunday homily, much of the public commentary has settled into a familiar framework. A conservative official invoked God in the context of war and a supposedly liberal pope rebuked him. The exchange is then cast as a political disagreement, or at most as an instance of religion being deployed on both sides of a geopolitical conflict.

This account is inadequate. What is unfolding is not a political dispute but a theological one, and its terms are ancient, not modern. In order to understand the public dialogue taking place between Hegseth and Leo, we need to turn to St. Augustine.